From 48b052322bd254cdff76d0cea515f8670b7f543e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Mendonca <brianmendonca@Brians-MacBook-Air.local>
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 12:09:42 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Security: sanitize inherited host exec env

---
 src/agents/bash-tools.exec-runtime.ts   | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 src/agents/bash-tools.exec.path.test.ts | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts           |  4 +++-
 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/agents/bash-tools.exec-runtime.ts b/src/agents/bash-tools.exec-runtime.ts
index 2a6db0566..05973993c 100644
--- a/src/agents/bash-tools.exec-runtime.ts
+++ b/src/agents/bash-tools.exec-runtime.ts
@@ -29,6 +29,23 @@ import {
 import { buildCursorPositionResponse, stripDsrRequests } from "./pty-dsr.js";
 import { getShellConfig, sanitizeBinaryOutput } from "./shell-utils.js";
 
+// Sanitize inherited host env before merge so dangerous variables from process.env
+// are not propagated into non-sandboxed executions.
+export function sanitizeHostBaseEnv(env: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {
+  const sanitized: Record<string, string> = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env)) {
+    const upperKey = key.toUpperCase();
+    if (upperKey === "PATH") {
+      sanitized[key] = value;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (isDangerousHostEnvVarName(upperKey)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    sanitized[key] = value;
+  }
+  return sanitized;
+}
 // Centralized sanitization helper.
 // Throws an error if dangerous variables or PATH modifications are detected on the host.
 export function validateHostEnv(env: Record<string, string>): void {
diff --git a/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.path.test.ts b/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.path.test.ts
index 5481ec966..041ee8672 100644
--- a/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.path.test.ts
+++ b/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.path.test.ts
@@ -166,6 +166,29 @@ describe("exec host env validation", () => {
     ).rejects.toThrow(/Security Violation: Environment variable 'LD_DEBUG' is forbidden/);
   });
 
+  it("strips dangerous inherited env vars from host execution", async () => {
+    if (isWin) {
+      return;
+    }
+    const original = process.env.SSLKEYLOGFILE;
+    process.env.SSLKEYLOGFILE = "/tmp/openclaw-ssl-keys.log";
+    try {
+      const { createExecTool } = await import("./bash-tools.exec.js");
+      const tool = createExecTool({ host: "gateway", security: "full", ask: "off" });
+      const result = await tool.execute("call1", {
+        command: "printf '%s' \"${SSLKEYLOGFILE:-}\"",
+      });
+      const output = normalizeText(result.content.find((c) => c.type === "text")?.text);
+      expect(output).not.toContain("/tmp/openclaw-ssl-keys.log");
+    } finally {
+      if (original === undefined) {
+        delete process.env.SSLKEYLOGFILE;
+      } else {
+        process.env.SSLKEYLOGFILE = original;
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
   it("defaults to sandbox when sandbox runtime is unavailable", async () => {
     const tool = createExecTool({ security: "full", ask: "off" });
 
diff --git a/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts b/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts
index a9d230c24..fac68eb82 100644
--- a/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts
+++ b/src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import {
   renderExecHostLabel,
   resolveApprovalRunningNoticeMs,
   runExecProcess,
+  sanitizeHostBaseEnv,
   execSchema,
   validateHostEnv,
 } from "./bash-tools.exec-runtime.js";
@@ -359,7 +360,8 @@ export function createExecTool(
         workdir = resolveWorkdir(rawWorkdir, warnings);
       }
 
-      const baseEnv = coerceEnv(process.env);
+      const inheritedBaseEnv = coerceEnv(process.env);
+      const baseEnv = host === "sandbox" ? inheritedBaseEnv : sanitizeHostBaseEnv(inheritedBaseEnv);
 
       // Logic: Sandbox gets raw env. Host (gateway/node) must pass validation.
       // We validate BEFORE merging to prevent any dangerous vars from entering the stream.