Files
Moltbot/src/security/audit-channel.ts
Josh Avant 0e4245063f CLI: make read-only SecretRef status flows degrade safely (#37023)
* CLI: add read-only SecretRef inspection

* CLI: fix read-only SecretRef status regressions

* CLI: preserve read-only SecretRef status fallbacks

* Docs: document read-only channel inspection hook

* CLI: preserve audit coverage for read-only SecretRefs

* CLI: fix read-only status account selection

* CLI: fix targeted gateway fallback analysis

* CLI: fix Slack HTTP read-only inspection

* CLI: align audit credential status checks

* CLI: restore Telegram read-only fallback semantics
2026-03-05 23:07:13 -06:00

726 lines
29 KiB
TypeScript

import {
hasConfiguredUnavailableCredentialStatus,
hasResolvedCredentialValue,
} from "../channels/account-snapshot-fields.js";
import { resolveChannelDefaultAccountId } from "../channels/plugins/helpers.js";
import type { listChannelPlugins } from "../channels/plugins/index.js";
import type { ChannelId } from "../channels/plugins/types.js";
import { inspectReadOnlyChannelAccount } from "../channels/read-only-account-inspect.js";
import {
isNumericTelegramUserId,
normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry,
} from "../channels/telegram/allow-from.js";
import { formatCliCommand } from "../cli/command-format.js";
import { resolveNativeCommandsEnabled, resolveNativeSkillsEnabled } from "../config/commands.js";
import type { OpenClawConfig } from "../config/config.js";
import { isDangerousNameMatchingEnabled } from "../config/dangerous-name-matching.js";
import { readChannelAllowFromStore } from "../pairing/pairing-store.js";
import { normalizeStringEntries } from "../shared/string-normalization.js";
import type { SecurityAuditFinding, SecurityAuditSeverity } from "./audit.js";
import { resolveDmAllowState } from "./dm-policy-shared.js";
import { isDiscordMutableAllowEntry } from "./mutable-allowlist-detectors.js";
function normalizeAllowFromList(list: Array<string | number> | undefined | null): string[] {
return normalizeStringEntries(Array.isArray(list) ? list : undefined);
}
function addDiscordNameBasedEntries(params: {
target: Set<string>;
values: unknown;
source: string;
}): void {
if (!Array.isArray(params.values)) {
return;
}
for (const value of params.values) {
if (!isDiscordMutableAllowEntry(String(value))) {
continue;
}
const text = String(value).trim();
if (!text) {
continue;
}
params.target.add(`${params.source}:${text}`);
}
}
function collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries(params: {
entries: unknown;
target: Set<string>;
}): void {
if (!Array.isArray(params.entries)) {
return;
}
for (const entry of params.entries) {
const normalized = normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(entry);
if (!normalized || normalized === "*") {
continue;
}
if (!isNumericTelegramUserId(normalized)) {
params.target.add(normalized);
}
}
}
function classifyChannelWarningSeverity(message: string): SecurityAuditSeverity {
const s = message.toLowerCase();
if (
s.includes("dms: open") ||
s.includes('grouppolicy="open"') ||
s.includes('dmpolicy="open"')
) {
return "critical";
}
if (s.includes("allows any") || s.includes("anyone can dm") || s.includes("public")) {
return "critical";
}
if (s.includes("locked") || s.includes("disabled")) {
return "info";
}
return "warn";
}
function dedupeFindings(findings: SecurityAuditFinding[]): SecurityAuditFinding[] {
const seen = new Set<string>();
const out: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
for (const finding of findings) {
const key = [
finding.checkId,
finding.severity,
finding.title,
finding.detail ?? "",
finding.remediation ?? "",
].join("\n");
if (seen.has(key)) {
continue;
}
seen.add(key);
out.push(finding);
}
return out;
}
function hasExplicitProviderAccountConfig(
cfg: OpenClawConfig,
provider: string,
accountId: string,
): boolean {
const channel = cfg.channels?.[provider];
if (!channel || typeof channel !== "object") {
return false;
}
const accounts = (channel as { accounts?: Record<string, unknown> }).accounts;
if (!accounts || typeof accounts !== "object") {
return false;
}
return Object.hasOwn(accounts, accountId);
}
export async function collectChannelSecurityFindings(params: {
cfg: OpenClawConfig;
sourceConfig?: OpenClawConfig;
plugins: ReturnType<typeof listChannelPlugins>;
}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
const sourceConfig = params.sourceConfig ?? params.cfg;
const inspectChannelAccount = (
plugin: (typeof params.plugins)[number],
cfg: OpenClawConfig,
accountId: string,
) =>
plugin.config.inspectAccount?.(cfg, accountId) ??
inspectReadOnlyChannelAccount({
channelId: plugin.id,
cfg,
accountId,
});
const asAccountRecord = (value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | null =>
value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)
? (value as Record<string, unknown>)
: null;
const resolveChannelAuditAccount = async (
plugin: (typeof params.plugins)[number],
accountId: string,
) => {
const sourceInspectedAccount = inspectChannelAccount(plugin, sourceConfig, accountId);
const resolvedInspectedAccount = inspectChannelAccount(plugin, params.cfg, accountId);
const sourceInspection = sourceInspectedAccount as {
enabled?: boolean;
configured?: boolean;
} | null;
const resolvedInspection = resolvedInspectedAccount as {
enabled?: boolean;
configured?: boolean;
} | null;
const resolvedAccount =
resolvedInspectedAccount ?? plugin.config.resolveAccount(params.cfg, accountId);
const useSourceUnavailableAccount = Boolean(
sourceInspectedAccount &&
hasConfiguredUnavailableCredentialStatus(sourceInspectedAccount) &&
(!hasResolvedCredentialValue(resolvedAccount) ||
(sourceInspection?.configured === true && resolvedInspection?.configured === false)),
);
const account = useSourceUnavailableAccount ? sourceInspectedAccount : resolvedAccount;
const selectedInspection = useSourceUnavailableAccount ? sourceInspection : resolvedInspection;
const accountRecord = asAccountRecord(account);
const enabled =
typeof selectedInspection?.enabled === "boolean"
? selectedInspection.enabled
: typeof accountRecord?.enabled === "boolean"
? accountRecord.enabled
: plugin.config.isEnabled
? plugin.config.isEnabled(account, params.cfg)
: true;
const configured =
typeof selectedInspection?.configured === "boolean"
? selectedInspection.configured
: typeof accountRecord?.configured === "boolean"
? accountRecord.configured
: plugin.config.isConfigured
? await plugin.config.isConfigured(account, params.cfg)
: true;
return { account, enabled, configured };
};
const coerceNativeSetting = (value: unknown): boolean | "auto" | undefined => {
if (value === true) {
return true;
}
if (value === false) {
return false;
}
if (value === "auto") {
return "auto";
}
return undefined;
};
const warnDmPolicy = async (input: {
label: string;
provider: ChannelId;
accountId: string;
dmPolicy: string;
allowFrom?: Array<string | number> | null;
policyPath?: string;
allowFromPath: string;
normalizeEntry?: (raw: string) => string;
}) => {
const policyPath = input.policyPath ?? `${input.allowFromPath}policy`;
const { hasWildcard, isMultiUserDm } = await resolveDmAllowState({
provider: input.provider,
accountId: input.accountId,
allowFrom: input.allowFrom,
normalizeEntry: input.normalizeEntry,
});
const dmScope = params.cfg.session?.dmScope ?? "main";
if (input.dmPolicy === "open") {
const allowFromKey = `${input.allowFromPath}allowFrom`;
findings.push({
checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open`,
severity: "critical",
title: `${input.label} DMs are open`,
detail: `${policyPath}="open" allows anyone to DM the bot.`,
remediation: `Use pairing/allowlist; if you really need open DMs, ensure ${allowFromKey} includes "*".`,
});
if (!hasWildcard) {
findings.push({
checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open_invalid`,
severity: "warn",
title: `${input.label} DM config looks inconsistent`,
detail: `"open" requires ${allowFromKey} to include "*".`,
});
}
}
if (input.dmPolicy === "disabled") {
findings.push({
checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.disabled`,
severity: "info",
title: `${input.label} DMs are disabled`,
detail: `${policyPath}="disabled" ignores inbound DMs.`,
});
return;
}
if (dmScope === "main" && isMultiUserDm) {
findings.push({
checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.scope_main_multiuser`,
severity: "warn",
title: `${input.label} DMs share the main session`,
detail:
"Multiple DM senders currently share the main session, which can leak context across users.",
remediation:
"Run: " +
formatCliCommand('openclaw config set session.dmScope "per-channel-peer"') +
' (or "per-account-channel-peer" for multi-account channels) to isolate DM sessions per sender.',
});
}
};
for (const plugin of params.plugins) {
if (!plugin.security) {
continue;
}
const accountIds = plugin.config.listAccountIds(sourceConfig);
const defaultAccountId = resolveChannelDefaultAccountId({
plugin,
cfg: sourceConfig,
accountIds,
});
const orderedAccountIds = Array.from(new Set([defaultAccountId, ...accountIds]));
for (const accountId of orderedAccountIds) {
const hasExplicitAccountPath = hasExplicitProviderAccountConfig(
sourceConfig,
plugin.id,
accountId,
);
const { account, enabled, configured } = await resolveChannelAuditAccount(plugin, accountId);
if (!enabled) {
continue;
}
if (!configured) {
continue;
}
const accountConfig = (account as { config?: Record<string, unknown> } | null | undefined)
?.config;
if (isDangerousNameMatchingEnabled(accountConfig)) {
const accountNote =
orderedAccountIds.length > 1 || hasExplicitAccountPath ? ` (account: ${accountId})` : "";
findings.push({
checkId: `channels.${plugin.id}.allowFrom.dangerous_name_matching_enabled`,
severity: "info",
title: `${plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id} dangerous name matching is enabled${accountNote}`,
detail:
"dangerouslyAllowNameMatching=true re-enables mutable name/email/tag matching for sender authorization. This is a break-glass compatibility mode, not a hardened default.",
remediation:
"Prefer stable sender IDs in allowlists, then disable dangerouslyAllowNameMatching.",
});
}
if (plugin.id === "discord") {
const discordCfg =
(account as { config?: Record<string, unknown> } | null)?.config ??
({} as Record<string, unknown>);
const dangerousNameMatchingEnabled = isDangerousNameMatchingEnabled(discordCfg);
const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore(
"discord",
process.env,
accountId,
).catch(() => []);
const discordNameBasedAllowEntries = new Set<string>();
const discordPathPrefix =
orderedAccountIds.length > 1 || hasExplicitAccountPath
? `channels.discord.accounts.${accountId}`
: "channels.discord";
addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
values: discordCfg.allowFrom,
source: `${discordPathPrefix}.allowFrom`,
});
addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
values: (discordCfg.dm as { allowFrom?: unknown } | undefined)?.allowFrom,
source: `${discordPathPrefix}.dm.allowFrom`,
});
addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
values: storeAllowFrom,
source: "~/.openclaw/credentials/discord-allowFrom.json",
});
const discordGuildEntries =
(discordCfg.guilds as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {};
for (const [guildKey, guildValue] of Object.entries(discordGuildEntries)) {
if (!guildValue || typeof guildValue !== "object") {
continue;
}
const guild = guildValue as Record<string, unknown>;
addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
values: guild.users,
source: `${discordPathPrefix}.guilds.${guildKey}.users`,
});
const channels = guild.channels;
if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") {
continue;
}
for (const [channelKey, channelValue] of Object.entries(
channels as Record<string, unknown>,
)) {
if (!channelValue || typeof channelValue !== "object") {
continue;
}
const channel = channelValue as Record<string, unknown>;
addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
values: channel.users,
source: `${discordPathPrefix}.guilds.${guildKey}.channels.${channelKey}.users`,
});
}
}
if (discordNameBasedAllowEntries.size > 0) {
const examples = Array.from(discordNameBasedAllowEntries).slice(0, 5);
const more =
discordNameBasedAllowEntries.size > examples.length
? ` (+${discordNameBasedAllowEntries.size - examples.length} more)`
: "";
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.discord.allowFrom.name_based_entries",
severity: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled ? "info" : "warn",
title: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
? "Discord allowlist uses break-glass name/tag matching"
: "Discord allowlist contains name or tag entries",
detail: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
? "Discord name/tag allowlist matching is explicitly enabled via dangerouslyAllowNameMatching. This mutable-identity mode is operator-selected break-glass behavior and out-of-scope for vulnerability reports by itself. " +
`Found: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`
: "Discord name/tag allowlist matching uses normalized slugs and can collide across users. " +
`Found: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`,
remediation: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
? "Prefer stable Discord IDs (or <@id>/user:<id>/pk:<id>), then disable dangerouslyAllowNameMatching."
: "Prefer stable Discord IDs (or <@id>/user:<id>/pk:<id>) in channels.discord.allowFrom and channels.discord.guilds.*.users, or explicitly opt in with dangerouslyAllowNameMatching=true if you accept the risk.",
});
}
const nativeEnabled = resolveNativeCommandsEnabled({
providerId: "discord",
providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
(discordCfg.commands as { native?: unknown } | undefined)?.native,
),
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.native,
});
const nativeSkillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
providerId: "discord",
providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
(discordCfg.commands as { nativeSkills?: unknown } | undefined)?.nativeSkills,
),
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
});
const slashEnabled = nativeEnabled || nativeSkillsEnabled;
if (slashEnabled) {
const defaultGroupPolicy = params.cfg.channels?.defaults?.groupPolicy;
const groupPolicy =
(discordCfg.groupPolicy as string | undefined) ?? defaultGroupPolicy ?? "allowlist";
const guildEntries = discordGuildEntries;
const guildsConfigured = Object.keys(guildEntries).length > 0;
const hasAnyUserAllowlist = Object.values(guildEntries).some((guild) => {
if (!guild || typeof guild !== "object") {
return false;
}
const g = guild as Record<string, unknown>;
if (Array.isArray(g.users) && g.users.length > 0) {
return true;
}
const channels = g.channels;
if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") {
return false;
}
return Object.values(channels as Record<string, unknown>).some((channel) => {
if (!channel || typeof channel !== "object") {
return false;
}
const c = channel as Record<string, unknown>;
return Array.isArray(c.users) && c.users.length > 0;
});
});
const dmAllowFromRaw = (discordCfg.dm as { allowFrom?: unknown } | undefined)?.allowFrom;
const dmAllowFrom = Array.isArray(dmAllowFromRaw) ? dmAllowFromRaw : [];
const ownerAllowFromConfigured =
normalizeAllowFromList([...dmAllowFrom, ...storeAllowFrom]).length > 0;
const useAccessGroups = params.cfg.commands?.useAccessGroups !== false;
if (
!useAccessGroups &&
groupPolicy !== "disabled" &&
guildsConfigured &&
!hasAnyUserAllowlist
) {
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.unrestricted",
severity: "critical",
title: "Discord slash commands are unrestricted",
detail:
"commands.useAccessGroups=false disables sender allowlists for Discord slash commands unless a per-guild/channel users allowlist is configured; with no users allowlist, any user in allowed guild channels can invoke /… commands.",
remediation:
"Set commands.useAccessGroups=true (recommended), or configure channels.discord.guilds.<id>.users (or channels.discord.guilds.<id>.channels.<channel>.users).",
});
} else if (
useAccessGroups &&
groupPolicy !== "disabled" &&
guildsConfigured &&
!ownerAllowFromConfigured &&
!hasAnyUserAllowlist
) {
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.no_allowlists",
severity: "warn",
title: "Discord slash commands have no allowlists",
detail:
"Discord slash commands are enabled, but neither an owner allowFrom list nor any per-guild/channel users allowlist is configured; /… commands will be rejected for everyone.",
remediation:
"Add your user id to channels.discord.allowFrom (or approve yourself via pairing), or configure channels.discord.guilds.<id>.users.",
});
}
}
}
if (plugin.id === "slack") {
const slackCfg =
(account as { config?: Record<string, unknown>; dm?: Record<string, unknown> } | null)
?.config ?? ({} as Record<string, unknown>);
const nativeEnabled = resolveNativeCommandsEnabled({
providerId: "slack",
providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
(slackCfg.commands as { native?: unknown } | undefined)?.native,
),
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.native,
});
const nativeSkillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
providerId: "slack",
providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
(slackCfg.commands as { nativeSkills?: unknown } | undefined)?.nativeSkills,
),
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
});
const slashCommandEnabled =
nativeEnabled ||
nativeSkillsEnabled ||
(slackCfg.slashCommand as { enabled?: unknown } | undefined)?.enabled === true;
if (slashCommandEnabled) {
const useAccessGroups = params.cfg.commands?.useAccessGroups !== false;
if (!useAccessGroups) {
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.useAccessGroups_off",
severity: "critical",
title: "Slack slash commands bypass access groups",
detail:
"Slack slash/native commands are enabled while commands.useAccessGroups=false; this can allow unrestricted /… command execution from channels/users you didn't explicitly authorize.",
remediation: "Set commands.useAccessGroups=true (recommended).",
});
} else {
const allowFromRaw = (
account as
| { config?: { allowFrom?: unknown }; dm?: { allowFrom?: unknown } }
| null
| undefined
)?.config?.allowFrom;
const legacyAllowFromRaw = (
account as { dm?: { allowFrom?: unknown } } | null | undefined
)?.dm?.allowFrom;
const allowFrom = Array.isArray(allowFromRaw)
? allowFromRaw
: Array.isArray(legacyAllowFromRaw)
? legacyAllowFromRaw
: [];
const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore(
"slack",
process.env,
accountId,
).catch(() => []);
const ownerAllowFromConfigured =
normalizeAllowFromList([...allowFrom, ...storeAllowFrom]).length > 0;
const channels = (slackCfg.channels as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {};
const hasAnyChannelUsersAllowlist = Object.values(channels).some((value) => {
if (!value || typeof value !== "object") {
return false;
}
const channel = value as Record<string, unknown>;
return Array.isArray(channel.users) && channel.users.length > 0;
});
if (!ownerAllowFromConfigured && !hasAnyChannelUsersAllowlist) {
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.no_allowlists",
severity: "warn",
title: "Slack slash commands have no allowlists",
detail:
"Slack slash/native commands are enabled, but neither an owner allowFrom list nor any channels.<id>.users allowlist is configured; /… commands will be rejected for everyone.",
remediation:
"Approve yourself via pairing (recommended), or set channels.slack.allowFrom and/or channels.slack.channels.<id>.users.",
});
}
}
}
}
const dmPolicy = plugin.security.resolveDmPolicy?.({
cfg: params.cfg,
accountId,
account,
});
if (dmPolicy) {
await warnDmPolicy({
label: plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id,
provider: plugin.id,
accountId,
dmPolicy: dmPolicy.policy,
allowFrom: dmPolicy.allowFrom,
policyPath: dmPolicy.policyPath,
allowFromPath: dmPolicy.allowFromPath,
normalizeEntry: dmPolicy.normalizeEntry,
});
}
if (plugin.security.collectWarnings) {
const warnings = await plugin.security.collectWarnings({
cfg: params.cfg,
accountId,
account,
});
for (const message of warnings ?? []) {
const trimmed = String(message).trim();
if (!trimmed) {
continue;
}
findings.push({
checkId: `channels.${plugin.id}.warning.${findings.length + 1}`,
severity: classifyChannelWarningSeverity(trimmed),
title: `${plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id} security warning`,
detail: trimmed.replace(/^-\s*/, ""),
});
}
}
if (plugin.id !== "telegram") {
continue;
}
const allowTextCommands = params.cfg.commands?.text !== false;
if (!allowTextCommands) {
continue;
}
const telegramCfg =
(account as { config?: Record<string, unknown> } | null)?.config ??
({} as Record<string, unknown>);
const defaultGroupPolicy = params.cfg.channels?.defaults?.groupPolicy;
const groupPolicy =
(telegramCfg.groupPolicy as string | undefined) ?? defaultGroupPolicy ?? "allowlist";
const groups = telegramCfg.groups as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
const groupsConfigured = Boolean(groups) && Object.keys(groups ?? {}).length > 0;
const groupAccessPossible =
groupPolicy === "open" || (groupPolicy === "allowlist" && groupsConfigured);
if (!groupAccessPossible) {
continue;
}
const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore(
"telegram",
process.env,
accountId,
).catch(() => []);
const storeHasWildcard = storeAllowFrom.some((v) => String(v).trim() === "*");
const invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries = new Set<string>();
collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
entries: storeAllowFrom,
target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
});
const groupAllowFrom = Array.isArray(telegramCfg.groupAllowFrom)
? telegramCfg.groupAllowFrom
: [];
const groupAllowFromHasWildcard = groupAllowFrom.some((v) => String(v).trim() === "*");
collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
entries: groupAllowFrom,
target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
});
const dmAllowFrom = Array.isArray(telegramCfg.allowFrom) ? telegramCfg.allowFrom : [];
collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
entries: dmAllowFrom,
target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
});
const anyGroupOverride = Boolean(
groups &&
Object.values(groups).some((value) => {
if (!value || typeof value !== "object") {
return false;
}
const group = value as Record<string, unknown>;
const allowFrom = Array.isArray(group.allowFrom) ? group.allowFrom : [];
if (allowFrom.length > 0) {
collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
entries: allowFrom,
target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
});
return true;
}
const topics = group.topics;
if (!topics || typeof topics !== "object") {
return false;
}
return Object.values(topics as Record<string, unknown>).some((topicValue) => {
if (!topicValue || typeof topicValue !== "object") {
return false;
}
const topic = topicValue as Record<string, unknown>;
const topicAllow = Array.isArray(topic.allowFrom) ? topic.allowFrom : [];
collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
entries: topicAllow,
target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
});
return topicAllow.length > 0;
});
}),
);
const hasAnySenderAllowlist =
storeAllowFrom.length > 0 || groupAllowFrom.length > 0 || anyGroupOverride;
if (invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size > 0) {
const examples = Array.from(invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries).slice(0, 5);
const more =
invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size > examples.length
? ` (+${invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size - examples.length} more)`
: "";
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.telegram.allowFrom.invalid_entries",
severity: "warn",
title: "Telegram allowlist contains non-numeric entries",
detail:
"Telegram sender authorization requires numeric Telegram user IDs. " +
`Found non-numeric allowFrom entries: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`,
remediation:
"Replace @username entries with numeric Telegram user IDs (use onboarding to resolve), then re-run the audit.",
});
}
if (storeHasWildcard || groupAllowFromHasWildcard) {
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.telegram.groups.allowFrom.wildcard",
severity: "critical",
title: "Telegram group allowlist contains wildcard",
detail:
'Telegram group sender allowlist contains "*", which allows any group member to run /… commands and control directives.',
remediation:
'Remove "*" from channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom and pairing store; prefer explicit numeric Telegram user IDs.',
});
continue;
}
if (!hasAnySenderAllowlist) {
const providerSetting = (telegramCfg.commands as { nativeSkills?: unknown } | undefined)
// oxlint-disable-next-line typescript/no-explicit-any
?.nativeSkills as any;
const skillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
providerId: "telegram",
providerSetting,
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
});
findings.push({
checkId: "channels.telegram.groups.allowFrom.missing",
severity: "critical",
title: "Telegram group commands have no sender allowlist",
detail:
`Telegram group access is enabled but no sender allowlist is configured; this allows any group member to invoke /… commands` +
(skillsEnabled ? " (including skill commands)." : "."),
remediation:
"Approve yourself via pairing (recommended), or set channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom (or per-group groups.<id>.allowFrom).",
});
}
}
}
return dedupeFindings(findings);
}