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Moltbot/src
orlyjamie 92cada2aca fix(security): block command substitution in unquoted heredoc bodies
The shell command analyzer (splitShellPipeline) skipped all token
validation while parsing heredoc bodies. When the heredoc delimiter
was unquoted, bash performs command substitution on the body content,
allowing $(cmd) and backtick expressions to execute arbitrary commands
that bypass the exec allowlist.

Track whether heredoc delimiters are quoted or unquoted. When unquoted,
scan the body for $( , ${ , and backtick tokens and reject the command.
Quoted heredocs (<<'EOF' / <<"EOF") are safe - the shell treats their
body as literal text.

Ref: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-65rx-fvh6-r4h2
2026-02-21 14:27:35 +01:00
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2026-02-20 13:32:49 -06:00