* fix: strip leading whitespace from sanitizeUserFacingText output
LLM responses frequently begin with \n\n, which survives through
sanitizeUserFacingText and reaches the channel as visible blank lines.
Root cause: the function used trimmed text for empty-checks but returned
the untrimmed 'stripped' variable. Two one-line fixes:
1. Return empty string (not whitespace-only 'stripped') for blank input
2. Apply trimStart() to the final return value
Fixes the same issue as #8052 and #10612 but at the root cause
(sanitizeUserFacingText) rather than scattering trimStart across
multiple delivery paths.
* Changelog: note sanitizeUserFacingText whitespace normalization
Co-authored-by: Tak Hoffman <781889+Takhoffman@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Tak Hoffman <781889+Takhoffman@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(security): validate OAuth state parameter to prevent CSRF attacks (OC-25)
The parseOAuthCallbackInput() function in the Chutes OAuth flow had two
critical bugs that completely defeated CSRF state validation:
1. State extracted from callback URL was never compared against the
expected cryptographic nonce, allowing attacker-controlled state values
2. When URL parsing failed (bare authorization code input), the catch block
fabricated a matching state using expectedState, making the caller's
CSRF check always pass
## Attack Flow
1. Victim runs `openclaw login chutes --manual`
2. System generates cryptographic state: randomBytes(16).toString("hex")
3. Browser opens: https://api.chutes.ai/idp/authorize?state=abc123...
4. Attacker obtains their OWN OAuth authorization code (out of band)
5. Attacker tricks victim into pasting just "EVIL_CODE" (not full URL)
6. parseOAuthCallbackInput("EVIL_CODE", "abc123...") is called
7. new URL("EVIL_CODE") throws → catch block executes
8. catch returns { code: "EVIL_CODE", state: "abc123..." } ← FABRICATED
9. Caller checks: parsed.state !== state → "abc123..." !== "abc123..." → FALSE
10. CSRF check passes! System calls exchangeChutesCodeForTokens()
11. Attacker's code exchanged for access + refresh tokens
12. Victim's account linked to attacker's OAuth session
Fix:
- Add explicit state validation against expectedState before returning
- Remove state fabrication from catch block; always return error for
non-URL input
- Add comprehensive unit tests for state validation
Remediated by Aether AI Agent security analysis.
* fix(security): harden chutes manual oauth state check (#16058) (thanks @aether-ai-agent)
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
* feat(sandbox): add separate browser.binds config for browser containers
Allow configuring bind mounts independently for browser containers via
sandbox.browser.binds. When set, browser containers use browser-specific
binds instead of inheriting docker.binds. Falls back to docker.binds
when browser.binds is not configured for backwards compatibility.
Closes#14614
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): honor empty browser binds override (#16230) (thanks @seheepeak)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
When the same plugin directory is discovered through different path
representations (e.g. symlinks), the manifest registry incorrectly
warns about a duplicate plugin id. This is a false positive that
appears for bundled extensions like feishu (#16208).
Compare fs.realpathSync() of both candidates' rootDir before emitting
the duplicate warning. If they resolve to the same physical directory,
silently skip the duplicate instead of warning.
Also change seenIds from Set<string> to Map<string, PluginCandidate>
to track the first-seen candidate for comparison.
Closes#16208
